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MARINE CORPS UNIT-LEVEL INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 






In this thesis, we offer recommendations to improve the 
current internal management controls for the Government-Wide 
Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) program.  Despite the existence 
of mandated internal management controls, the program has been 
fraught with fraud, misuse, and abuse since its implementation.  
The 2002 General Accounting Office testimony on the Department 
of the Navy GCPC program noted the continued existence of 
significant internal control weaknesses, despite a number of 
improvements made to the program over several years.  Using the 
fraud triangle as its philosophical construct, this thesis 
develops practical methods by which to lessen the ability of 
those involved with administration of a GCPC program to 
rationalize improper and illegal actions.  Its specific 
recommendations are to: convert the GCPC cards from 
individually named credit cards to unit cards with personalized 
numbers; change the appearance of the cards; control the number 
of cards within each unit by authorizing level five agency 
program coordinators to define and implement best practice 
controls; and provide electronic receipts of all cardholder 
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All federal agencies, including the Department of 
Defense (DoD), use the Government-Wide Commercial Purchase 
Card (GCPC) for making “micro-purchases”, which are defined 
as purchases, from commercial vendors, involving sums up to 
$2500.  Although purchase cards can be used along with 
other contracting methods to pay for purchases up to 
$9,999,900, their primary use has been to enable 
cardholders to buy low-dollar value items for the 
government from civilian vendors while avoiding the longer 
and more costly traditional acquisition process.  The 
simplification of the purchasing process provided by the 
GCPC program has proven of tremendous benefit to the DoD; 
it has sped delivery of low-dollar value items while 
lowering the direct costs associated with those purchases.  
However, the program has also experienced shortcomings, 
particularly with regard to its internal control 
environment. 
As highlighted in the 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force 
Final Report and the 2002 General Accounting Office 
testimony on Navy purchase card vulnerabilities, weaknesses 
have existed throughout the DoN and Marine Corps in the 
internal controls associated with the GCPC program.  These 
weaknesses include lack of adherence to key internal 
controls, and have been coupled with high levels of fraud 
and GCPC program card misuse and abuse.  In recent years 
the DoD and the DoN have attempted to address many of the 
GCPC program shortcomings, principally by focusing efforts 
toward developing means to identify fraud and to limit the 
potential for GCPC program card misuse and abuse. 
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Despite the significant improvements made to the GCPC 
program internal control environment in the recent past, 
one area which holds potential to further improve the GCPC 
program internal control environment has not as yet 
received sufficient attention.  That area pertains the 
rationalization leg of the fraud triangle, an internal 
management control concept discussed by Joseph T. Wells in 
his book titled Occupational Fraud and Abuse.  According to 
the fraud triangle theory, one way to help ensure an 
adequate internal control environment is to limit an 
individual’s ability to rationalize his or her potentially 
illicit activities. 
The four recommendations contained within this report 
were developed by the authors as means of combating the 
rationalization we believe is inherent in the current GCPC 
program.  Our recommendations are to: convert the GCPC 
cards from individually named credit cards to unit cards 
with personalized numbers; change the appearance of the 
cards; control the number of cards within each unit by 
authorizing level five APCs to define and implement “best 
practice” controls; and provide electronic receipts of all 
cardholder transactions daily to approving officials and 
agency program coordinators.  By implementing these four 
changes, the authors believe the DoN and Marine Corps can 
reduce the levels of fraud, misuse, and abuse currently 
experienced within the GCPC program. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. FRAUD, ABUSE, AND MISUSE IN THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE 
COMMERCIAL PURCHASE CARD PROGRAM 
Military personnel did personal shopping at Wal-
Mart and The Home Depot, partied at Hooters and 
Bottoms Up nightclubs and charged personal items 
like DVD players, computers, and pet supplies to 
their government purchase cards, according to 
documents obtained by The Associated Press.1 
Documents gathered by Grassley from the Bank of 
America, which handles Pentagon travel credit 
cards, detail the case of a Marine sergeant who 
ran up $20,000 in charges, then left the service 
and the bill unpaid.  The Marine's credit card 
for travel, issued in March 2000, was restricted 
because he had a questionable credit record.  His 
bosses soon quadrupled its limit from $2,500 to 
$10,000, the documents show.  The bank issued a 
fraud warning in August 2000 after suspicious 
activity on the card, but the Marines raised the 
credit limit twice more to $25,000.  The sergeant 
eventually made two cash withdrawals from the 
card over two months totaling $8,500.  The 
Marine's credit was finally revoked in February, 
almost a year after it was issued, and he left 
the service.  The bank was forced to write off 
the debt as a loss.2 
 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has uncovered 
what may be the tip of the iceberg with regard to 
improper purchases by people empowered to buy 
using their government-wide purchase cards at two 
Navy units in San Diego.  GAO found "With the 
ineffective overall internal control environment, 
it is not surprising that the three basic 




1. http://www.detnews.com/2001/politics/0107/29/politics-256479.htm, Author: 
John Solomon, Associated Press, Pentagon Employees Rang Up $9 Billion on 
Government Credit Cards, 28 Jul 2001 
 
2. FreeRepublic.com, Author: AP, “A Conservative News Forum”, 7/27/2001 
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They also recounted five cases of alleged 
purchase card fraud of which one case has been 
successfully prosecuted.  The amount involved in 
all five was over $660,000 to date with 
investigations continuing in the remaining four 
cases.  Here’s what was bought for personal use: 
home improvement items, laptops, electronic 
organizers, DVD players, an air conditioner, 
clothing, jewelry, and other items such as 
eyeglasses, pet supplies, phone calls, tires, 
flowers, and pizza.  GAO says, "The control 
breakdowns related to the frauds were so 
pervasive that the total dollar amount of these 
frauds could not be determined."  
One unit bought flat panel computer monitors 
costing from $800 to $2,500 each instead of 
standard monitors costing $300.  When asked about 
this at a congressional hearing, the Navy 
suggested that they were required to conserve 
space onboard ships.  However, not all were used 
onboard ships.  Also uncovered were routine 
purchases without documented government need, 
including electronic organizers as well as the 
accompanying $100 designer carrying cases and a 
$400 leather briefcase.  Neither Navy unit had 
documented policies and procedures to support the 
valid need for these types of items.  There also 
were cases where a cardholder’s single day 
purchases from the same vendor appeared to be a 
circumvention of the cardholder’s single purchase 
limit.3 
 
As highlighted in the preceding articles, it has 
proven difficult for the Department of Defense (DoD), 
Department of the Navy (DoN), and U.S. Marine Corps to 
maintain adequate internal control environments for the 
Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC) and 
Official Travel Card programs.  This difficulty has been  
 
3. http://www.managementconcepts.com/acquisition/NavyCardarchive.asp, 24 Oct 03 
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manifested in numerous instances of purchase card program 
fraud, and card abuse and misuse.  And yet having a robust 
internal control environment is a key factor in preventing 
the types of illicit card use which have all too often 
characterized the program.  In seeking ways to improve 
existing internal controls for the purchase card program, 
one would naturally review current management ideas dealing 
with internal controls for organizations.  One current such 
management idea was discussed by Joseph T. Wells, founder 
of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, in his 
book Occupational Fraud and Abuse.  Wells argues that for 
fraud to occur there must exist three legs of support for a 
fraud triangle, those legs consisting of incentive, 
opportunity, and rationalization. 
Accordingly, one way to help ensure an adequate 
internal control environment is to limit an individual’s 
ability to rationalize his or her potentially illicit 
activities; by lessening the ability of an individual to 
convince himself that his activities are justifiable (due 
to perceived urgency of need, that he deserves or requires 
an item despite existing guidance or instructions to the 
contrary, that an action can be construed as within the 
larger meaning of those instructions, etc.), an 
organization should be able to lower the probability that 
members of that organization will commit fraud against it.  
Along with measures designed to limit the ability of 
individuals to rationalize wrongful behavior, internal 
controls can also be designed to limit the opportunities, 
and where possible the incentives, to commit fraud. 
Undoubtedly, because the GCPC program provides 
individuals the ability to access and use large amounts of 
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government credit, the program will always be vulnerable to 
the risk of fraud.  An incentive to steal is inherent in 
the program, and a thief determined to steal by use of his 
GCPC card obviously will have the opportunity to do so.  
However, automated measures (such as restrictions, or 
blocks, on where purchases can be made), verification 
requirements, and audit procedures can largely suffice to 
identify illicit card use and monetarily limit an 
individual’s ability to defraud the government. 
On the other hand, an individual who intentionally 
steals makes no attempt to rationalize his activities.  As 
can be ascertained from the Marine Corps’ Purchase Card 
Semi-Annual Review for the first half of fiscal year 2003 
(Appendix A), many of those making illicit purchases with 
their GCPC cards or ignoring existing, mandatory internal 
controls and established internal control processes, would 
not consider themselves thieves.  At the time of their 
illicit purchases, they most likely rationalized those 
purchases as not being the illegal activities they in fact 
were. 
Whether purchasing a sandwich at Subway or bedding and 
towels for a visiting foreign military officer, otherwise 
trusted and diligent government employees improperly used 
their government purchase cards; yet because many of those 
purchases involved very low dollar amounts or did not 
directly benefit the purchaser, it is likely they saw those 
purchases as not truly representing fraud against the 
government of the United States.  Additionally, the 
cardholder’s  unit  may  tend to see any illicit use as 
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reflecting only on the individual cardholder and not on the 
unit itself as the card are issued in the cardholder’s, and 
not the unit’s, name. 
  This ability to rationalize card fraud, misuse, and 
abuse contributes to the poor internal control environment 
perceived to exist throughout the GCPC program and detailed 
in both the 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report 
and General Accounting Office (GAO) Testimony regarding 
Navy vulnerabilities to fraud.  While one could debate the 
legitimacy of the rationalizations a GCPC program 
cardholder might make, and while the ability to rationalize 
a wrongful action does not make it justifiable, the current 
purchase card internal control environment can be improved 
by implementing internal control measures designed to help 
eliminate the ability of individuals to rationalize the 
improper use of GCPC program cards.  In this report we will 
attempt to develop practical means by which to lessen the 
ability of those involved with administration of a GCPC 
program to rationalize improper and illegal actions.  First 
however, we will outline the current structure and 
functioning of the GCPC program and further expand upon the 
underlying management theory that guided the development of 
this report. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE COMMERCIAL PURCHASE 
CARD PROGRAM 
 
The GCPC program has its roots in the 1982 
Presidential Executive Order 12352, “Procurement Reform”, 
which directed the DoD, as well as all executive agencies, 
to, “Establish programs to simplify small purchases” along 
 8 
with other initiatives intended to streamline and simplify 
various governmental procurement processes.4  On July 6, 
1998, the DoN awarded a three-year contract, with options 
for extending the service period, to Citibank to provide 
purchase card services throughout the DoN.5  Currently  
managed by the DoN eBusiness Operations Office 
(EBUSOPSOFF), the program is part of the U.S. General  
Services Administration’s (GSA) “SmartPay” program, whose 
current contracts with five service providers (Bank of 
America, Bank One, Citibank, Mellon Bank, and U.S. Bank) 
are effective until November 29, 2003.6   
For the Marine Corps, the Contracts Division, 
Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps (LB, I&L, HQMC) has oversight responsibility 
for the GCPC program and maintains a GCPC program office 
within the Management and Oversight Branch (LBM) of the LB 
Division. 
According to the executive summary of the June 27, 
2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, 
implementation of the GCPC program had resulted in an 
estimated savings of $900 million by the report date.  GCPC 
program-generated savings result from rebates based on 
volume of transactions and cost reductions resulting from 







4. Executive Order 12352, 17 Mar 1982. 
 
5. http://www.don-ebusiness.navsup.navy.mil, 30 Oct 2003. 
 
6. http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8199&channelPage= 
%2Fep%2Fchannel%2FgsaOverview.jsp&channelId=-13497, 31 Oct 2003. 
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The purpose of the GCPC program, as stated in the 
EBUSOPSOFF Instruction (EBUSOPSOFFINST) 4200.1A, is: 
 
to provide DoN civilian and military employees a 
convenient and commercially available method to 
make low-dollar value purchases.7 
 
Low-dollar purchases, also called “micro-purchases”, are 
defined as those less than $2500.  Purchase cards are used 
throughout the DoD and can be used along with other  
contracting methods to pay for purchases up to $9,999,900. 
  In essence, GCPC cards are commercial credit cards.  
The cards enable cardholders to buy low-dollar value items 
for the government from civilian vendors while avoiding the 
longer and more costly traditional acquisition process.  
This simplification of the purchasing process has proven of 
tremendous benefit to the DoD; it has sped delivery of low-
dollar value items while lowering the direct costs 
associated with those purchases.  However, the program has 
also experienced shortcomings, particularly with regard to 
its internal control environment.  
As highlighted in the 2002 GAO testimony on Navy 
purchase card vulnerabilities, weaknesses have existed 
throughout the DoN in the internal controls associated with 
the GCPC program.  These weaknesses, which include lack of 
adherence to key internal controls and shortcomings in the 
program’s management culture and existing supporting 





7. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. III. 
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abuse by GCPC cardholders.8  These types of weaknesses, 
common to GCPC programs throughout the DoD and the entire 
U.S. Government, have drawn increasing managerial attention 
within DoD since implementation of the GCPC program.  Past 
attempts to improve the GCPC program internal control 
environment have included measures designed to identify 
fraud as well as to limit the potential for card misuse and 
abuse.  The DoN and Marine Corps have addressed many of the 
weaknesses articulated in the 2002 GAO testimony and DoD 
Charge Card Task Force Final Report, and we will briefly 
outline the recommendations made in those reports and the 
corrective actions already taken in response to those 
recommendations. 
But, despite the significant improvements made to the 
GCPC program internal control environment in the recent 
past, our research into the GCPC program and those past 
improvements has led us to believe that one area which 
holds potential to further improve the GCPC program 
internal control environment has not as yet received 
sufficient attention.  That area pertains to the concept of 
the rationalization leg of the fraud triangle, which we 
will discuss in this report.  We believe that by 
implementing measures designed to reduce the potential for 
rationalization of illicit purchases by cardholders, the 
Marine Corps, DoN, and DoD could further improve the 
current GCPC program internal control environment.  As 
such, we offer four specific recommendations to improve the 
GCPC program internal control environment for Marine Corps  
 
 
8. GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial 
Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House 
of Representatives, p. 2. 
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units which administer GCPC programs: conversion of the 
GCPC program from individually named issued credit cards to 
unit cards with personalized card numbers; changing the 
physical appearance of the GCPC program cards; authorizing 
level five APCs to determine unit best practice; and 
providing electronic receipts of all cardholder 
transactions to Approving Officials (AOs) and Agency 
Program Coordinators (APCs). 
 
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
 
This report is focused on the internal management 
controls associated with GCPC programs in Marine Corps 
operating forces units.  Although recommendations contained 
within this report may be applicable to other managerial 
levels of the GCPC program, we sought specifically to 
examine existing internal management controls in use by 
Marine Corps operating forces units and to offer 
recommendations for improving those controls.  Currently, 
each unit managing a GCPC program must meet specified 
controls (which we will outline in this report) and is 
encouraged to implement other local controls as deemed 
necessary by the unit. 
The topic of examining the internal controls for the 
GCPC program was originally suggested by an action officer 
from LB, I&L, HQMC as an area which held potential for a 
Naval Postgraduate School Master of Business Administration 
Project.  Our research began with a review of the 2002 GAO 
Testimony regarding Navy vulnerabilities to fraud and GCPC 
program card abuse and the 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force 
Final Report, extended to review of existing DoD and DoN 
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testimonies regarding the internal controls and existing 
weaknesses found throughout many levels of the GCPC program 
within the DoD and DoN, and included reviews of current DoN 
orders and regulations for management of a GCPC program.  
We also reviewed the on-line training programs sponsored by 
the DoN e-Business Operations Office and the Defense 
Acquisition University Continuous Learning Center.  We 
conducted interviews with the Marine Corps Base Camp 
Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar APCs as to 
the strengths and weaknesses they saw within their programs 
and conducted phone interviews or sought information from a 
variety of other individuals involved in management of the 
GCPC program in the Marine Corps and within the DoN. 
Following our initial review of documents, we narrowed 
the scope of our research to focus strictly on the internal 
control environment associated with management of a GCPC 
program at the Marine Corps unit (battalion/squadron) 
level.  By doing so, we limited our detailed evaluation to 
those controls mandated or recommended for use by unit 
cardholders, approving officials, and agency program 
coordinators.  We found that many potential improvements 
applicable to all levels of the DoD GCPC program had 
already been identified or implemented.  The types of 
improvements made to the GCPC program in the last several 
years include automation of the billing statement 
reconciliation process (and thus a speeding up of the 
payment process to card issuers), limitation of the number 
of cardholders managed by AOs and APCs, improvement to GCPC 
program training, and development of data-mining 
capabilities.  Rather than attempting to evaluate those 
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initiatives, we sought to identify new areas in which the 
internal controls for a unit-level GCPC program could be 
strengthened.   
As a result of our research, we have identified what 
we believe to be an area in which the GCPC program internal 
control environment can be further improved.  By 
implementing measures designed to help break the 
rationalization leg of the fraud triangle, we believe the 
occurrence of fraud, misuse, and abuse of GCPC cards can be 
further reduced.  This report will detail our 
recommendations for accomplishing that reduction. 
 
D. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
 
As depicted below, the fraud triangle consists of 
three legs, each of which, according to the theory, need to 














The Society for Human Resource Management describes the 
fraud triangle as follows: 
To reduce embezzlement losses, experts say 
employers must start by examining the three 
factors that lead employees to pocket 
corporate dollars. Those factors form “the 
fraud triangle,” which is expressed by the 
following equation: motivation + opportunity 
+ rationalization = embezzlement. 
Motivation refers to financial pressure on 
employees—such as medical bills, college 
tuition payments, gambling debts, lifestyle 
changes, etc. — with additional stress if 
the employee feels he can’t share his 
predicament with others. 
Opportunity means an employee is in a 
position to embezzle. That can translate to 
access to cash, goods or other company 
assets — and controls that are inadequate or 
non-existent. 
Rationalization is the personal 
justification employees use to convince 
themselves to commit embezzlement. “It’s 
just a loan,” they might tell themselves. 
Other rationalizations include: I’m 
underpaid compared to others; I’m entitled, 
the boss is getting paid too much; others 
are doing it, etc. 
The good news is that employers can slash 
the potential for embezzlement if they 
eliminate or reduce any one of the three 
elements.9 
As we will discuss in this report, we believe past 
efforts to improve the GCPC program internal control  
 
9. Society for Human Resource Management October 2003, Vol. 48, No. 10, The Five-
Finger Bonus by Robert J. Grossman.  Used with permission of HR Magazine, 
published by the Society for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, Va. All rights 
reserved. 
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environment have mainly targeted the opportunity leg of the 
fraud triangle, with the goals of lessening the opportunity 
for individuals to commit fraud and to quickly identify 
fraud, as well as card misuse and abuse, when it occurs.  
Our recommendations will be targeted instead toward 
reducing the rationalization leg of the fraud triangle; by 
successfully doing so we believe units administering GCPC 
programs can improve their existing GCPC internal control 
environments.  Before detailing our recommendations, we 
will outline the functioning of a purchase card program and 
discuss pertinent elements of the 2002 GAO testimony and 
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II.  THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE COMMERCIAL PURCHASE CARD 
PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
A.  GCPC PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
 
 Several layers of responsibility are involved in the 
administration of a DoN GCPC program; the program follows 




















Figure 2.  Purchase Card Hierarchy Diagram.  (From: DoN 






While not exhaustive in specifying all aspects of the 
administration of a local GCPC program, we will sketch how 
the program is intended to function and describe the duties 
of those involved in a local program in the next few 
paragraphs.  We then describe the internal controls for a 
GCPC program as specified in EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A. 
 
 
B.  GCPC PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION 
 
 At the lowest level of the GCPC program is the actual 
GCPC cardholder.  Next is the Approving Official (AO), 
responsible for approving the cardholder’s purchases and 
certifying monthly invoices from Citibank.  The unit-level 
(level five) Agency Program Coordinator (APC) supervises 
the entire unit’s GCPC program for the Head of Activity 
(HA), normally the unit’s Commanding Officer.  Above the HA 
are various APC levels, individuals responsible for 
coordinating an ever-broadening scope of the GCPC program, 
up to the Major Claimancy level. 
Per EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, all DoN GCPC program 
cardholders, AOs, and APCs are required to complete GCPC 
program training before beginning to participate in the 
program.  The training can be conducted over the internet 
and consists of a minimum of two different parts.  Training 
tailored to individual roles within a GCPC program is 
offered on the Navy’s e-Business website; additionally, 
participants must take the GCPC program tutorial offered 
through the Defense Acquisition University Continuous 
Learning Center.10  Once training is completed, GCPC program 
 
     
10. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 26 
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participants are required to adhere to the program 
administration rules outlined in the EBUSOPSOFFINST 
4200.1A. 
The training available from the DoN eBusiness 
Operations Office is available at www.don- 





Figure 3. Purchase Card Training. (From: http//www.don-
ebusiness.navsup.navy.mil) 
 
By clicking a computer mouse on the different portions 
of this website, an individual is automatically linked to 
training tailored to his specific duties within the GCPC 
program, as well as being afforded on-line access to other 
documents and information, such as EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A 
and various desk guides.  After successfully completing the 
initial training, individuals are required to complete 
refresher training at least once every two years, as well 
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as completing annual ethics training (as found in Joint 
Ethics Regulations DoD 5500 7-R and 5 CFR 2638.705).11 
Although in practice the administrative structure of a 
GCPC program may vary slightly from unit to unit based on 
differing capabilities and requirements (for instance, due 
to personnel restrictions, an AO could also serve as a 
cardholder within a unit), the basic structure is the 
straightforward hierarchy depicted in Figure 2.  Following 
successful completion of training and designation by the 
HA, an individual is assigned duties as a cardholder, AO, 
or APC, and Citibank is notified (by the unit’s APC, or 
next higher level APC) of the assignment.  AOs can 
supervise up to seven subordinate cardholder accounts and 
are responsible for overseeing and auditing those accounts.  
A level five (i.e., unit) APC can be assigned to oversee up 
to three hundred individual cardholder accounts.  Once a 
cardholder has been officially assigned as such by his HA, 
the APC sets up the GCPC program cardholder’s account with 
Citibank, normally on-line, and the cardholder then 
receives a GCPC program card from Citibank.  The unit APC 
also ensures cardholders attend required refresher 
training, facilitates the issuance of the card to the 
cardholder, and sets the cardholder’s single purchase and 
monthly transaction limits, as designated by the HA. 
The GCPC is issued individually to the cardholder and, 
although stating that the card is to be used only for 
official U.S. Government purchases, bears the cardholder’s 
name.  The cardholder is responsible for making only 
approved purchases with the card and bears pecuniary  
 
11. EUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 26 
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liability to the U.S. Government for illegal purchases.  
The cardholder is also responsible to review mandatory 
sources of supply (the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act Program 
(JWOD), Federal Prison Industries (FPI), and per the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act), reconcile monthly 
billing statements from Citibank, act to resolve any 
discrepancies in those statements, and certify monthly 
invoices for payment. 
AOs approve cardholder purchases, verify the monthly 
statements for each of their cardholders, and forward their 
certifications of those statements to Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service (DFAS).  Upon AO certification of a 
cardholder’s monthly statement, DFAS pays Citibank for the 
validated transactions. 
 Level five APCs, in addition to overseeing the 
training of cardholders and AOs and the issuance of GCPC 
cards within their units, coordinate with higher-level 
APCs, monitor the activities of their AOs and cardholders, 
and coordinate with Citibank when necessary to help resolve 
discrepancies.  Level five APCs also conduct monthly 
transactional reviews of the transactions of all their 
subordinate cardholders, attempting to identify any 
questionable card activity for additional investigation (p. 
29), and ensure the accuracy of their account profiles at 
least quarterly (by checking to ensure the AO/cardholder 
span of control remains within boundaries and that those 
individuals listed by Citibank as active members of the 
local program are in fact still participants in the 
program.12   
 
12. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 27. 
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Additionally, level five APCs are responsible to 
conduct semi-annual reviews of the functioning of their 
local programs.13  
Lastly, EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A specifies that a unit 
Review Official (RO) audit AO certifications using 
stratified statistical random sampling methods.  The RO, 
although a member of the unit, should not be within the 
AO’s supervisory chain-of-command and is meant to provide 
an additional means to help ensure the validity and 
timeliness of GCPC program payments (pp 4 & 15-16).14 
Although as described in the EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, a 
GCPC unit program appears uncomplicated, in practice one 
may prove difficult to manage due to personnel rotations, 
lack of program familiarization among participants, or 
other factors.  Likewise, the internal controls specified 
in the Instruction and the training materials which serve 
the program appear simple and logical, and in many cases 
intuitive.  It is to a description of the internal controls 
specified in the EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A which we next turn. 
 
 
C.   GCPC PROGRAM INTERNAL CONTROLS 
 
In addition to outlining the individual 
responsibilities of those involved in a GCPC program, 
EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A specifies the internal controls to 
be used to help prevent GCPC program card fraud, misuse, 
and abuse.  These controls include: separation of duties; 
separation of functions; limitation of spans of control; 
completion of required training; establishment of single  
 
13. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 28. 
 
14. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 4 & 15-16. 
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purchase and billing cycle (30 days) limits; limitation of  
authorized transaction types; utilization of merchant 
category code blocks; closure of unneeded accounts; and 
conduct of internal program reviews.   The Instruction also 
encourages units to develop their own internal operating 
procedures for management of their individual, local GCPC 
programs.   
According to the Instruction, cardholders, AOs, and 
APCs should be different individuals; when such separation 
is not possible, the Instruction outlines procedures to 
ensure that more than one individual is involved in the 
purchasing, receipting, and accounting for items procured 
by use of a GCPC program card.  In addition to this 
separation of duties, the Instruction also requires a 
separation of functions, specifying that someone other than 
the cardholder receipt for purchased items, or at least 
verifies receipt of purchased items if the cardholder is 
also the end user of the items being purchased.  These 
procedures to separate program administration duties and 
purchase and receipt functions are intended to ensure that 
no one individual can solely conduct, receipt for, approve, 
certify, and account for GCPC purchases.  Ensuring that 
multiple individuals are involved in the purchase and 
receipt of items and the certification of those 
transactions for payment is a fundamental control measure 
designed to limit the potential for perpetration of fraud 
within an organization. 
EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A limits spans of control within 
a GCPC program.  AOs are limited to supervising no more 
than seven cardholders, while level five APCs are limited 
to overseeing a total of three hundred cardholders.  These 
 24 
spans of control are meant to ensure both AOs and APCs can 
reasonably conduct their review and audit responsibilities 
as outlined in the Instruction. 
As described previously, unit APCs act to ensure all 
GCPC program personnel complete at least the required 
initial training prior to participation in the program; 
they are also responsible to ensure participants complete 
refresher training at least once every two years and annual 
ethics training.  Additionally, APCs establish cardholder 
single purchase and billing cycle monetary limits as 
specified by the AH who appointed the cardholder.  These 
limits are supposed to be based on an analysis of unit 
historic spending patterns and should reflect actual unit 
spending requirements. 
While the enforcement of training requirements 
certainly helps ensure individuals remain cognizant of the 
proper boundaries of the use of their GCPC program cards, 
limitations to spending authorizations are intended to 
lessen the monetary impact of any fraud or other illicit 
spending.  As a cardholder can not exceed his single 
purchase or monthly limits without his APC increasing those 
purchase card authorization limits, any attempt to 
illicitly spend the government’s money at a level higher 
than that normally expended by a unit in a day or during a 
month would require the collusion of the APC in the 
attempted fraudulent use of the card. 
A cardholder’s account can be limited to certain 
transaction types (no internet orders, for instance), and 
all cards within the DoD are blocked from use at businesses 
registered under certain merchant category codes (see 
Appendix B for a full listing of DoD-wide blocked codes).  
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These blocks prevent all purchases at merchants categorized 
by those codes.  Other merchant category codes can be 
blocked if not needed by the individual cardholder for the 
types of transactions he is authorized to conduct.  
Limiting transaction types and blocking merchant codes are 
measures designed to prevent approval of transactions at 
the point of sale at businesses for which there is no 
identified requirement for the cardholder to make 
purchases.  Furthermore, enclosure (2) of EBUSOSOFFINST 
4200.1A lists additional prohibitions pertaining to use of 
the GCPC, as well specifying the rules governing exceptions 
to those prohibitions.  These internal controls are, of 
course, intended to help prevent cardholders from knowingly 
or inadvertently using their GCPC cards to conduct 
proscribed transactions. 
 According to EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, APCs are to 
suspend cardholder accounts thirty days before a cardholder 
transfers from the command and to close inactive or no 
longer needed accounts.15  The thirty-day suspension is 
intended to ensure a cardholder does not transfer from his 
command before certification of his last monthly bill.  AOs 
must review every cardholder transaction monthly before 
certifying their cardholder’s statements, and ROs are 
required to audit the monthly AO certifications for all the 
unit’s cardholders.  Although level five APCs do not have 
to certify each individual cardholder transaction (which 
can easily number in the thousands), they do have to screen 
all those transactions and attempt to identify fraudulent 
activity in the accounts.  APCs are specifically directed  
 
15. EBUSOPSOFFINST 4200.1A, p. 27 
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to attempt to identify suspicious vendors, split purchases, 
inequitable distribution of business, and any other 
suspected card misuse or fraud.  APCs also must conduct 
semi-annual reviews of the internal controls associated 
with their GCPC programs. 
 Lastly, AHs and APCs are encouraged to establish other 
controls, as they see fit, to help limit the potential for 
fraud, abuse, and misuse within their GCPC programs.  
Although the internal controls described in the preceding 
paragraphs would appear sufficient to enable GCPC program 
administrators to effectively manage a GCPC program and 
prevent wide-spread instances of fraudulent use of GCPC 
program cards, they often have not sufficed; the 2002 GAO 
Testimony and DoD Report detail significant weaknesses in 
the GCPC program internal control environment, despite the 
existence of those internal controls listed previously and 
the continuous efforts made to strengthen them since the 
inception of the GCPC program. 
Although it is not the purpose of this report to 
highlight what may be the short-comings of existing GCPC 
program internal controls, we believe those controls have 
largely been aimed at limiting the opportunity for 
individuals to commit fraud, misuse, and abuse with their 
GCPC cards, and to identify fraud, misuse, and abuse when 
it occurs.  While certainly an instrumental part of any 
internal control program, the use of controls aimed at 
denying individuals the opportunity to commit fraud and to 
quickly identify its occurrence is in and of itself an 
incomplete solution, particularly when the incentives to 
commit fraud (in the case of the GCPC program, the ready 
access to large amounts of government credit) can not be 
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eliminated.  Although recent efforts to improve the 
training provided to those participating in the GCPC 
program may in fact be intended to prevent individuals from 
easily rationalizing illicit purchases and misuse of their 
GCPC program cards, we believe additional measures can be 
implemented to combat the rationalization leg of the fraud 
triangle.  Before we detail those recommendations however, 
we will first describe how the GCPC program creates savings 
for the U.S. Government while speeding the more traditional 























III.  THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE COMMERCIAL PURCHASE CARD 




A.  GCPC PROGRAM SAVINGS CREATION 
 
 The purchase card program was designed to provide a 
less costly and more efficient way for all the DoD 
organizations to buy goods and services.  By authorizing 
cardholders to buy low-cost supplies and services with the 
GCPC card, the DoD has been able to, and will continue to 
be able to, leverage its resources by increasing its 
efficiencies.  Through the GCPC program, DoD components 
have their operating needs quickly satisfied at reduced 
costs. 
To provide an illustrative example of the dramatic 
benefits of the GCPC program to Marine Corps operating 
forces units, one need only remember the supply process for 
needed items not held in current unit inventory consumable 
supply stocks nor available at Direct Support Stock Control 
before implementation of the GCPC program.  Prior to having 
GCPC purchase cards in units, Marines submitted formal 
requests for required items through their chain of command.  
If those requests were approved by each level of the chain, 
they were then answered at (at the minimum) the 
Battalion/Group-level supply departments.  The approval 
process alone could take several days, with additional time 
required for actual purchase and delivery of the requested 
items.  Today through use of the GCPC program card, units 
can in most cases immediately satisfy their supply needs, 
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the same day, through a commercial vendor, without the 
requirement for the lengthy approval process. 
This streamlining of the acquisition process saves the 
DoD an estimated $20 for every item purchased with the card 
as compared to the former, strictly paper-based, approval-
laden buying process.16  In 2002, GCPC cardholders made more 
than ten million purchases with GCPC program cards, saving 
the government in excess of $200 million in administrative 
costs.  As stated by Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer Dov S. Zakheim at 
a June 27, 2002 press conference in regards to GCPC program 
cards, "they really are essential to improving business 
practices."17 
In addition to saving the government money by 
streamlining the acquisition process, Citibank also has a 
provision in its purchase card contract to provide the 
government with cash rebates or refunds for early or on-
time payments.  This refund is a deduction from the amount 
charged or a return of part of the price paid for each 
purchase.  The rebate or refund computation formula is 
included in the purchase card contract; the rebate amount 
is calculated monthly by Citibank for all purchases made 
with DoD GCPC program cards and verified by DFAS.  Rebates 
or refunds attributable to the use of the government 
purchase cards are credited to operation and maintenance 
(O&M) accounts of the DoD.  Although individual units don’t 





17.  Defense Link, DoD Moves to Improve Charge Card Programs, 27 Jun 2002. 
 31 
O&M purchasing power, the savings to DoD can be 
substantial.18  Figure 4 shows the rebate savings amounts 
calculated (in thousands) through September 2003. 
 
 
FY 03  DoD Purchase Card Usage US Bank and 
Citibank  
  Total Accounts Fiscal Year thru 30 Sep 03 TOTAL 
Agency B/O C/H Sales  Transactions Rebates 
Navy 
(17) *4,823 19,807 $1,853,181 2,539 $4,436 
Army 








3,108 7,207 $   599,072 666 $2,769 
            
Totals  53,427 141,373 $7,235,977 10,735 $ 36,082 
        
 




B. THE ORDER-DOCUMENTATION-PAY CYCLE 
 
Perhaps the greatest success of the GPCP program, as 
well as the basis for much of its cost effectiveness, is 
the savings enjoyed by the DoD in man-hours required to 
administer low-dollar value acquisitions throughout the 
department.  The current program’s use of electronic 
billing and reconciliation processes has been a dramatic 
improvement over the initial GCPC program manual processes.  
Prior to 1998, the GCPC program billing, reconciliation, 
 
18. DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R 
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and payment process consisted of six steps: 
 1) Cardholder purchases and receives item from 
merchant.  The Merchant’s bank processes card transactions 
and the card-issuing bank pays the merchant. 
 2) Card-issuing bank mails monthly paper statements to 
cardholder and approving official. 
 3) Cardholder reconciles statement. 
 4) Cardholder attaches supporting documentation and 
submits reconciled statement to approving official. 
 5) Approving official reviews purchases, approves and 
certifies invoice, and mails certified invoice to the 
paying office. 
 6) Paying office electronically transmits payment to 
card-issuing bank.19 
 
 Under this paper-based and mail-reliant process, the 
ability to review transactions was limited to the end of 
the billing cycle, when the paper statements were received 
by both the cardholders and their approving officials.  If 
a mail delay occurred for any reason, the entire 
reconciliation and payment process would be delayed, 
potentially adding weeks to the time between the bank’s 
forwarding of the invoice and its receipt of final payment.  
Any such delay significantly increased the potential for 
violation of the Prompt Payment Act, with corresponding 
interest payments having to be made to the GCPC program 
card issuers as well as the loss to the government of any 
rebates based on timely payment of GCPC program card bills. 
 
 
19. Testimony of Mr. Bruce Sullivan. 
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In 1998, the GSA re-competed the contract for GCPC 
services.  As a result of that competition, the program now 
includes an internet-based capability to setup, manage, and 
cancel GCPC program card accounts as well as to review, in 
real time, credit card transactions as they post to the 
banks’ systems.  This on-line capability also allows GCPC 
cardholders to reconcile and certify their accounts only 
one day after the end of the billing cycle and to forward 
those certifications to their respective approving 
officials.  AOs are also able to certify all of their 
cardholder accounts on-line and forward their 
certifications electronically to the card issuer.  Through 
the internet, on-line certification can occur weeks before 
paper billing statements are even received by the 
cardholders and AOs. 
Upon receipt of an AO’s certification, the bank 
reformats the invoice, summarizes (or rolls up) all of the 
cardholders’ transactions by lines of accounting, and 
transmits the certified invoice to the supporting finance 
and accounting system.  The Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS) electronically processes the invoices and 
pays the bill.  Through electronic certification and 
payment, DFAS has lowered the rate it charges its DoD 
Component customers for bill-paying services by as much as 
sixty percent, or approximately $20 per transaction. 
 Another benefit of the on-line approval and 
certification process is that it ultimately enhances 
internal controls by instilling greater discipline in the 
program.  The timeliness and detail of information 
available concerning GCPC transactions enhances the ability 
of cardholders, AOs, and APCs to effectively manage their 
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programs.  Invoices do not get paid unless cardholders and 
AOs reconcile their accounts, and APCs are able to almost 
effortlessly track current account and reconciliation 
status’.  Additionally, the on-line process decreases 
delinquencies and Prompt Payment Act interest penalties 
since it enables invoices to be certified within a few days 
of the end of the billing cycle date, removing the impact 
of any mail delays between geographically separated card-
issuing banks, certifying officials, and payment offices. 
Currently, over eighty percent of Marine Corps 
purchase card invoices are paid by use of the electronic 
billing, reconciliation, and payment process.  The 2002 DoD 
Charge Card Task Force recommended that every government 
agency accelerate the electronic certification and bill 
paying systems for purchase cards, or obtain waivers from 

















IV.  2002 REVIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT-WIDE COMMERCIAL 
PURCHASE CARD PROGRAM 
A. THE 2002 DOD CHARGE CARD TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 
 
Issued on June 27, 2002, the DoD Charge Card Task 
Force Final Report highlighted several problems with DoD 
charge card programs (including the GCPC program) as well 
as recommending solutions to those problems.  The problems 
the report listed included misuse, abuse, and fraud 
attributed to poorly enforced internal controls.  The 
report also recommended strengthening those controls and: 
 
enhancing the capability of the workforce to 
accomplish assigned charge card responsibilities20 
 
The report recognized that the decentralization of 
procurement authority (for micro-purchases) from 
contracting organizations had increased the potential for 
purchase authority to be vested in individuals lacking 
procurement training and experience.21  The report stated 
that: 
 
Among the most critical management controls in 
the purchase card program are the monthly review 
and approval of the cardholder’s statement by the 
approving official.22 
 
The report highlighted two areas of concern relevant 
to the GCPC program: misuse/abuse of the cards and late  




20. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. vi 
 
21. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, pp. 2-5 
 
22. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, pp. 2-4 
 36 
split purchases to exceed spending limits; purchase of 
prohibited goods and services; purchase of items for non-
governmental use or that do not represent best value to the 
government; failure of the review process while certifying 
invoices; fraud; and failure to properly receipt and 
account for purchased items.  The report listed the primary 
cause for card misuse/abuse as the failure of local 
organizations to implement available internal controls, 
leading to several weaknesses in the internal control 
environment which included: unmanageable spans of control 
and excessive numbers of cardholders; inadequate training 
for cardholders and approving officials; inadequate review 
of purchases; failure to use required supply sources; lack 
of documentation and accounting for purchases; and 
cardholder misuse of cards, including fraudulent purchases 
and exceeding card limits. 
Although intentional misuse may not be preventable, 
the report indicated that effective internal controls are 
the key to identifying any such misuse, thereby limiting it 
(ideally) to one billing cycle, and to correcting the 
various program deficiencies annotated in the report.  The 
report did note the actions which DoD had already taken to 
strengthen the purchase card program.  Those actions 
included: limiting the approving official to cardholder 
ratio to 1:7; lowering card spending limits; blocking 
unneeded merchant category codes for individual cards 
(thereby tailoring the card to the types of purchases 
normally required by the organization); and expanding audit 
coverage.  The report also recognized DoN initiatives to 
emphasize program accountability, improve training and 
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reinforce training requirements, and ensure the adequacy of 
local internal controls. 
Additionally, the report noted the importance of 
organizational culture in the operation of an effective 
purchase card program, specifically highlighting the need 
for adequate resources (individuals assigned to management 
of the program) to be devoted to the program.  Included in 
the need for adequate resources were standardization of APC 
skill sets and the establishment of mandatory, standardized 
training for all personnel involved in the purchase card 
program. 
Further, the Task Force recommended accelerating 
implementation of electronic billing, enabling on-line 
statement review, approval, and certification as a method 
to resolve the problem with late bill payment, and 
enhancing fraud detection capabilities through the use of 
data-mining. 
Citibank offers a powerful suite of automated tools 
that APCs can use to conduct an on-line statement review, 
approval, and certification of all cardholder accounts.  
These on-line tools aid in resolving problems associated 
with late payments, interest penalties, and the loss of 
rebates.  These electronic capabilities provide APCs with 
the capability to review transactions in near real-time 
and, according to the Report, permit approving officials to 
perform continuous reviews into each of their cardholder 
accounts during the billing cycle, preventing a last minute 
deluge of receipts and invoices associated with the end of 
month reconciliation process. 
Currently, eighty percent of all Marine Corps accounts 
are utilizing the on-line certification process.  According 
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to the DoN E-Business Operations Office, the reasons not 
all units use the electronic review and certification 
capabilities right now are: some deployed units are without 
internet access; some units located outside the continental 
United States cannot maintain high enough quality 
connectivity to the internet to permit reliable use of the 
systems electronic capabilities; and the bank's online 
certification system does not accommodate all DoD 
accounting systems, necessitating certain units to certify 
their billing statements manually. 
Despite these unresolved problems, the internet is 
available at most locations worldwide, including aboard 
nearly all of the U.S. Navy’s ships.  Additionally, with 
DoD initiatives to standardize all DoD accounting systems, 
many of the current limitations to electronic review and 
billing statement certification will become less prevalent 
in the future. 
Lastly, the report recommended clarifying and 
strengthening sanctions for non-compliance with internal 
controls, including: applying pecuniary liability to 
cardholders and approving officials; increasing prosecution 
of cases of fraud; and strengthening compliance language in 
existing regulations through consolidation of existing 
guidance and reiteration of the potential penalties for 
card misuse and non-compliance with internal controls.  In 
its specific recommendations, the task force recommended 
DoD: 
Develop methods to assure more positive control 




23. 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, recommendation CO-3 
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B. THE 2002 GAO TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
REFORM, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REGARDING NAVY 
VULNERABILITIES TO FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE PURCHASE 
CARD PROGRAM 
 
The 2002 GAO testimony stated that  
 
the control weaknesses we identified at the two 
Navy units in San Diego were representative of 
systemic Navy-wide purchase card control 
weaknesses24   
 
 The control weaknesses were systemic within the entire 
DoN, to include the Marine Corps.  The GAO testimony 
highlighted several weaknesses which echoed those 
identified by the DoD Charge Card Task Force.  The 
testimony stressed the need: for cultural change within the 
DoN to improve management attention toward the purchase 
card program; to ensure reasonable spans of control among 
APCs and AOs; to limit credit levels to historic needs; and 
to improve training at all levels of the program.  The GAO 
also noted that credit limits were commonly established 
arbitrarily instead of being based upon unit historical 
spending and that training, though available, was often not 
being documented for individuals involved in the purchase 
card program.  Nor was the existing training tailored to 
the differing needs of individuals performing different 
functions within the program.   
The GAO testimony further stated that there were 
insufficient (human) resources devoted to monitoring and 
oversight of the GCPC program, resulting in the inability 
 
24. 2002 GAO Testimony, p. 2. 
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of APCs and AOs to effectively audit their programs.  It 
also noted failures in implementation of internal controls, 
to include failing to screen for required vendors, 
weaknesses in documentation and acceptance of items, and 
non-reconciliation of statements prior to certification.  
The testimony highlighted the occurrence of three types of 
improper purchases by GCPC cardholders: purchases not 
serving an authorized governmental purpose; split 
purchases; and purchases from improper sources. 
 However, the GAO did note the DoN recognized the 
deficiencies in GCPC program administration, stating that 
the: 
 
Navy has taken action or said it plans to 
implement all 29 of our recommendations to 
improve controls over the purchase card program.25 
 
 
C. GCPC PROGRAM WEAKNESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The many GCPC program weaknesses identified within the 
2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report and GAO 
Testimony were seen to be common throughout DoD, DoN, and 
Marine Corps purchase card programs.  The identification of 
those weaknesses, coupled with recommendations to alleviate 
them, helped strengthen the GCPC program internal control 
environment as corrective actions were implemented to 
address those internal control weaknesses.  For instance, 
our interview with the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar APC 
confirmed the positive effect of the increased use of 
electronic certification in solving the problem of late 
 
25. 2002 GAO Testimony, p. 3. 
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certification of Citibank invoices.  Although noting a 
still existing problem with AO turnover, this APC confirmed 
she no longer experienced late certifications from those 
AOs performing electronic certification of invoices.26  
In addition to enabling on-line review and 
certification of billing statements, other improvements to 
the GCPC program have included: creation of data-mining 
capabilities through Citibank; limitation to the spans of 
control of those involved in a GCPC program; improvements 
to, and tailoring of, GCPC training programs; and increased 
management attention paid to the administration of GCPC 
programs throughout the DoD.  However, as we have stated 
previously, these improvements appear principally directed 
at limiting the opportunity for individuals to commit fraud 
by use of GCPC program cards and to quickly identify any 
fraud or card misuse once it occurs.  Undoubtedly, these 
initiatives have strengthened the GCPC internal control 
environment.  But rather than attempting to gain even 
further ground in limiting the opportunity for fraud or 
enhancing detection capabilities, the recommendations made 
in the concluding chapter of this report are directed 
against a different aspect of the “fraud triangle,” that of 
rationalization.  By lessening the potential for GCPC 
program cardholders and administrators to rationalize 
wrongful use of GCPC purchase cards, the Marine Corps, DoN, 




































V.   RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The benefits of the GCPC program are numerous and 
include: 
 1) Providing commercial credit cards and associated 
services in support of official government purchases. 
 2) Streamlining ordering, payment and procurement 
procedures, reducing administrative processing costs. 
 3) Improving government micro-purchase procurement 
operations and accountability. 
 4) Lowering the costs associated with micro-purchase 
and other commercial transactions. 
 5) Reducing the administrative paperwork associated 
with acquisition through governmental supply and 
acquisition channels. 
 6) Providing a wide variety of options when procuring 
items from commercial vendors. 
 7) Supporting operational forces’ high operational 
tempo and worldwide commitments by empowering commanders 
with micro-purchase authority.   
 
To improve the efficiency of the GCPC program, the 
DoD, the DoN, and the Marine Corps have taken many steps in 
the recent past to strengthen the internal controls 
associated with GCPC program management.  Training modules 
are now available on-line and are tailored to the differing 
needs of individuals performing different functions at 
different levels within the GCPC program, making the 
required training both more accessible and more useful to 
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individuals.  Cardholders and approving officials are able 
to electronically review and certify monthly billing 
statements, helping to negate the potential for late 
payments to Citibank.  By mid-2003, the Marine Corps had 
reduced its number of active cardholders by over half, from 
nearly 6,000 to 2,806.27  Elimination of unneeded cardholder 
accounts greatly improves the ability of AOs and APCs to 
manage the active accounts within their areas of 
responsibility and thus improves the likelihood of 
effective program management. 
However, there remain weaknesses in the internal 
controls of the unit-level GCPC programs, which we believe 
could be readily improved.  Our recommendations to further 
improve the GCPC program are to: 
 1) Convert the GCPC cards from individually named 
credit cards to unit cards with personalized numbers. 
 2) Change the appearance of the cards. 
 3) Control the number of cards within each unit by 
authorizing level five APCs to define and implement “best 
practice” controls. 
4) Provide electronic receipts of all cardholder 









27. Headquarters, Marine Corps, Purchase Card Semi-Annual Review, October 1,2002 – 
March 30, 2003 
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1. Recommendation #1: Convert the GCPC Cards from 
 Individually Named Credit Cards to Unit Cards 
 with Personalized Numbers. 
 
The DoD utilizes two types of credit card accounts: 
Centrally Billed Accounts (CBAs) and Individually Billed 
Accounts (IBAs).  CBAs are normally used by organizations 
to centrally procure travel services (such as buying 
airline tickets).  The bank issues CBAs to DoD 
organizations, and the payment of billed charges is solely 
a governmental liability.  IBAs are government charge cards 
issued to military members and DoD civilian employees with 
their names embossed on the front of the cards.  The 
individual cardholder is responsible for the prompt 
payment, in full, of the amount stated on the monthly 
billing statement and can be held criminally liable for any 
fraud committed against the government by use of the card, 
and for other misuse or abuse of the card.  However, when 
an authorized cardholder (someone assigned in writing to 
conduct purchases for the government) makes a purchase with 
a card, whether the purchase is appropriate or 
inappropriate, the government is also legally liable for 
payment to the card issuer. 
GCPC purchase cards are issued with the cardholder’s 
name embossed on them as an internal control measure.  
Since only the individual cardholder can make purchases 
with the card (as only his name is on it), it is relatively 
simple to establish who made a questionable purchase.  
However, since the cards are similar in appearance to non-
government credit cards and since the individual’s name 
appears on the card, there is a risk that an individual may 
mistake the GCPC card for his personal credit card or be 
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able to rationalize illicit use of the GCPC program card as 
it is “his” because it bears his name. 
 Additionally, by issuing purchase cards to individual 
Marines with their names embossed on the cards, the Marine 
Corps is recognizing those cardholders as possessing 
sufficient maturity, responsibility, and competence to 
conduct commercial financial transactions on behalf of the 
government.  As those assigned as cardholders, particularly 
in operational forces units, are likely to be very junior 
Marines within the unit, this high level of trust may not 
be commensurate with their actual personal financial 
situations or maturity levels; the incentives associated 
with access to large amounts of government credit may in 
fact create significant levels of temptation to commit 
fraud while also providing a ready source of 
rationalization.  Particularly for individuals with little 
experience in financial management prior to entering the 
service, the issuance of a credit card with their name on 
it, which looks strikingly similar to a personal credit 
card, may be providing them an undeserved sense of 
entitlement to the use of the card.  It is also 
unnecessary. 
 In contrast, when administering unit (CBA) credit 
cards, the determination of who made an actual illicit 
purchase can be a much more difficult endeavor as many 
individuals may have access to a particular card, even 
during the course of a single day.  However, it is much 
more difficult for an individual to rationalize misuse of a 
unit card as it does not bear his name.  Additionally, unit 
cards have to be accounted for by the unit to which the 
card is issued, and improper use of unit cards personally 
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reflects on the commander of the unit as the cards are 
directly under his control, not circuitously through the 
AO/APC hierarchy.    
DoN’s current service contract with Citibank does not 
limit the Marine Corps in the structure of its GCPC card 
accounts, meaning whether the cards are issued to 
individuals or to organizations is determinable by the 
Marine Corps.  For this reason, the Marine Corps can tailor 
its GCPC program to incorporate the benefits of unit cards 
with the pecuniary control mechanisms associated with 
individually issued credit cards.  By issuing the GCPC 
program cards with unit identifiers instead of personal 
names embossed on the front of the cards while associating 
card numbers to individual cardholders, the Marine Corps 
can negate much of the potential for rationalization 
inherent in the current program while maintaining a high 
level of card use accountability.  To accomplish this would 
require modification to the current GCPC cards. 
 The authors’ recommendation for a revised GCPC unit 
card is depicted in Figure (6).  The card would still be 
issued directly from Citibank to the cardholder, but would 
not bear the cardholder’s name.  For accountability and to 
establish pecuniary responsibility to the cardholder, the 
last four digits of the card would be used to identify the 
individual cardholder.  APCs and HAs would have increased 
interest in ensuring detaching cardholders returned their 
cards and had their accounts deactivated as the cards would 
be directly associable to the unit instead of to the 
individual cardholder.  As is true of the program as 
currently administered, the cardholder would have sole 
access to his GCPC card while serving as a cardholder, yet 
 48 
one potential source of the ability of a cardholder to 
rationalize illicit purchases (believing the card to be his 
because his name is on it) would be eliminated. 
 The existence of GCPC cards with unit names instead of 
individual names embossed on the fronts of the cards should 
also have the positive effect of increasing the attention 
HAs pay to who they designate as cardholders.  Fraud, 
misuse, or abuse of a card would reflect negatively on the 
unit and its commander, instead of being primarily limited 
to reflecting upon the individual cardholder.  
Additionally, statistical metrics could more readily be 
devised to accentuate poorly managed unit GCPC programs. 
 
2. Recommendation #2: Change the Appearance of the  
 Cards 
 
According to the Camp Pendleton APC, cardholders had 
sometimes explained that their illicit GCPC program card 
purchases were simple mistakes made because their GCPC 
program cards looked too much like their other, personal 
credit cards.  Changing the GCPC program card appearance to 
make it more distinctive is an obvious solution to this 
type of confusion experienced by cardholders.  The current 
GCPC program card, depicted in Figure (5), is very visually 
appealing and contains the sentence “For Official US 
Government Purchases Only” in faint, extremely small print 
under a large heading reading “United States of America.”  
In addition to GCPC cardholder confusion, vendors seeing 
the large “VISA” symbol and the embossed cardholder’s name 
can themselves easily overlook the tiny official purchase 
warning. 
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 Although one benefit of the current appearance of the 
GCPC card is likely its unquestioned acceptance by 
commercial vendors as it looks largely like any other 
personal credit card, the card’s appearance can be modified 
to eliminate any cardholder perception that the card isn’t 
as “official” as it is in reality.  Figure (6) is the 
author’s redesign recommendation.  This card, while still 
looking somewhat like a personal credit card would bear the 
issuing unit’s name instead of the individual cardholder’s 
name and state in large print “FOR OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT 
PURCHASES ONLY, CARDHOLDER VIOLATIONS SUBJECT TO 31 U.S.C 
3528”.  We believe a cardholder would find it much more 
difficult to rationalize illicit purchases with such a 



















The GCPC program card of today: 
 
The current GCPC 
promotes                                   
personal spending and 
minimizes 
accountability by 
user’s and Unit 
Commanders. 
 
Figure 5. The Current GCPC Purchase Card. 
 
 
The GCPC program card of tomorrow: 
 
A distinctive appearance with a very readable header with 
the following: 
                
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FOR OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT PURCHASES ONLY 
CARD HOLDER VIOLATIONS SUBJECT TO 31 U.S.C 3528 
 
Figure 6. Proposed GCPC Purchase Card. 
These last four digits 
would be different for 
every user; the numbers 
will identify the card’s 
authorized user 
The unit name would 
replace the individual 
cardholder’s name here 
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3.  Recommendation #3: Control the Number of Cards 
Within Each Unit by Authorizing Level Five APCs 
to Define and Implement Best Practice Controls  
   
As of the writing of this report, the Marine Corps had 
2,806 Cardholders, 1,310 AO’s, and 120 APC’s.  This level 
of GCPC program administrators represents a ratio of 23 
cardholders per APC and 2.15 cardholders per AO, ratios 
well within the mandated spans of control of three hundred 
cardholders per APC and seven cardholders per AO.  However, 
according to the 2002 DoD Charge Card Task Force Final 
Report: 
there is no standard span of control for the 
Agency Program Coordinator’s (APCs). The number 
of purchase card accounts assigned to an APC 
should be limited to a number that allows for 
proper administration of the purchase card 
program and execution of the internal control 
functions.28 
 
The Task Force recommended a best practice approach to 
determining the appropriate number of cardholders within a 
unit rather than establishment of a specific number for all 
units administering GCPC programs.  However, best practice 
appears to be an undefined concept.  
 One can surmise that best practice should include not 
only a determination of how many cardholders are needed to 
provide a certain level of purchasing services, but also 
include analysis of such things as how well cardholders are 
trained, managed, supervised, and disciplined if fraud or 
card misuse occurs.  The best practice conceivably starts 
with each unit justifying a need for a cardholder, ensuring  
 
28. DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. 2-12. 
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cardholders are properly trained, and having AOs ensure 
their cardholders adhere to GCPC program guidelines. 
The level five APC is ultimately responsible for the 
success of a local GCPC program; therefore APCs should 
determine what constitutes best practice within their spans 
of control and thus be empowered to decide how many 
cardholders are required within their units.  The level 
five APC, most responsible for the day-to-day operation of 
a unit GCPC program, is the individual best able to 
determine GCPC program managerial needs for his unit. 
 For example, if a unit makes on average one hundred 
GCPC purchases per month, the APC might determine the 
unit’s cardholder requirement to be only two cardholders.  
If the unit’s requirement for commercial micro-purchases 
were to increase, necessitating the assignment of an 
additional cardholder within the unit, the HA would justify 
such increase to the APC in writing.  Conversely, should 
the unit’s purchase card usage dramatically drop, the APC 
would notify the HA that one of the active cardholder 
accounts would be deactivated.  The unit APC, the 
individual in the best position to monitor the daily 
purchase card activity of the unit, should be empowered to 
fully manage the local program. 
 This recommendation is designed to strengthen unit 
GCPC program internal management controls by increasing the 
administrative burden involved in justifying excess numbers 
of cardholders within individual units.  Currently, units 
can keep their numbers of cardholder accounts unnecessarily 
large without having to justify the number of their 
accounts, as long as they do not exceed the mandated ratios 
of cardholders to AOs and APCs. 
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4. Provide Electronic Receipts of All    
 Cardholder Transactions Daily to AOs and   
 APCs 
 
As stated in the DoD Task Force Final 
Report: 
 
the most critical management controls in the 
purchase card program are the monthly review and 
approval of the cardholder’s statement by the 
approving official.29 
 
As previously discussed in this report, Citibank 
provides an on-line capability to data-mine account 
transaction activity for all GCPC accounts.  Currently, 
APCs and AOs are required to review, and for the AOs to 
certify, their cardholder’s accounts on a monthly basis.  
Yet technology could easily make review of account statuses 
a daily activity for APCs and AOs.  By providing them an 
account summary on a daily versus monthly basis, the GCPC 
program control environment can be improved.   
     APCs and AOs, screening their cardholder transactions 
daily, would no longer face the deluge of end of billing 
cycle verifications which presently confront them.  This 
monthly deluge, along with the requirement to quickly 
complete the verification and certification processes, can 
tempt GCPC program administrators to perform a less than 
detailed review of their cardholder’s monthly transactional 
activities.  By reviewing the day’s transactions that day, 
APCs and AOs would be able to more readily identify 
questionable transactions; the necessity to review 
transactions daily would add a level of discipline to the 
present review and certification process.  Since the 
 
29. DoD Charge Card Task Force Final Report, p. 2-4. 
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requirement to review and certify all cardholder  
transactions already exists, daily review only disciplines, 
instead of adding to, current requirements. 
     Additionally, cardholders, well aware that each 
transaction would be reviewed by both the AO and the APC 
the day the purchase was made, would be less able to 
rationalize questionable purchases.  The knowledge that any 
such purchases would be more likely to be immediately 
identified would help negate the potential for cardholders 
to self-justify illicit card use by believing such use to 




 Fraud may not be fully preventable in any procurement 
process or program.  Some incentive will always exist to 
steal, as will some opportunity to commit fraud.  Likewise, 
even well designed internal controls have little impact in 
preventing fraud if they are not effectively implemented.  
Because of these factors, some of the internal controls 
designed for use in the GCPC program may not have had as 
great an affect in limiting GCPC program fraud or card 
misuse as originally intended; certainly the difficulties 
in maintaining robust internal control environments thus 
far experienced throughout DoD and other federal agencies 
indicate that existing internal controls for the GCPC 
program have not been completely effective. 
Breakdowns in internal controls are both 
extraordinarily easy to envision and exceedingly difficult 
to prevent.  For example, if an AO, pressed for time, does 
not actually review all the transactions for a particular 
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cardholder and instead simply certifies the invoice to 
ensure it is submitted on time, there exists a potential 
for fraud to escape detection.  If a unit, due to personnel 
limitations for instance, does not really separate the 
duties of purchasing, receipting for, and inventorying 
purchased items, the GCPC cardholder making the purchase 
has ample opportunity to defraud the government.  No matter 
how well the administrators designed the controls, no 
system or process can reasonably be made fraud-proof. 
In recent years, much has been done to improve the 
ability of GCPC program administrators to limit the 
opportunity for fraud and GCPC program card misuse and 
abuse, and to detect such fraud or abuse when it occurs.  
In addition to these past initiatives, other preventive 
measures can be undertaken to positively influence the 
mindsets of those involved in the Government-wide 
Commercial Purchase Card program.  Limiting the ability of 
individuals to rationalize wrongful use of GCPC program 
cards can help to improve the program’s internal control 
environment and further reduce instances of illicit 
purchases with GCPC program cards.  By implementing the 
recommendations contained within this report, the authors 
believe the Marine Corps, DoN, and DoD can enhance 







































APPENDIX A.  PURCHASE CARD RESPONSE FORMAT 
 
SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEW 
OCTOBER 1, 2002 – MARCH 30, 2003 
Date: 4 June 2003 
 
Command:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
 
POC:  Capt Chester McMillon 
 




USMC Level III results include all hierarchies. The 
training numbers reflect the Level IV hierarchy 00055, 
Marine Corps Community Services (USMC NAF) GCPC personnel 
that have not met current DoD and DoN training 
requirements. 
 
A. Total number of Agency Program Coordinators (APCs): 160 
 
B. Total number of Approving Officials (AOs): 1,676 
 
C. Total number of purchase card accounts: 3,955 
 
D. Number of APCs that exceeds the ratio of 300 card 
accounts to one APC: 0 
 
E. Average Claimancy ratio of purchase card accounts to 
AOs: 2.36 cardholders per AO. 
 
F. Number of AO accounts above the ratio of 7 card accounts 
to one AO. 0 
 
G. Number of Cardholders, AOs, APCs with documented 
evidence of successful completion of mandatory training. 
(All USMC APCs, AOs, and cardholders, with the exception of 
the MCCS (USMC NAF) 00055 hierarchy, have been suspended 





H. Questionable transactions: 
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1. Number of purchases not required to fulfill minimum, 
immediate need to support DoN mission: 33 
2. Number of purchases not for government use, but for 
personal use: 25 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Weight belt  
Dollar Value of Transaction: $13.99 
How it was discovered: AO review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Phone charge 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $1.10 
How it was discovered: AO Review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Phone charge 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $2.25 
How it was discovered: AO Review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Extra room charge  
Dollar Value of Transaction: $5.00 
How it was discovered: AO Review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Extra room charge  
Dollar Value of Transaction: $5.00 
How it was discovered: AO Review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Ribbon/flowers display 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $90.10 
How it was discovered: Security 





Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Subway sandwich 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $5.29 
How it was discovered: AO review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder counseled. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Theater tickets 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $80.00 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder verbally reprimanded. The Level III APC has 
instructed the Level IV APC to provide written 
documentation of the violation, guidance on proper 
procedures, consequences of future violations to the 
discrepant party. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Golf green fees 
Dollar Value of Transaction: 35.00 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder verbally reprimanded. The Level III APC has 
instructed the Level IV APC to provide written 
documentation of the violation, guidance on proper 
procedures, consequences of future violations to the 
discrepant party. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Community Services (00055) 
Item Purchased: Magazines 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $20.66 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Activity reimbursed and 
cardholder suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune (00073) 
Item Purchased: Bedding, towels, kitchen items at Target 
for Peruvian Officer 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $488.70 
How it was discovered: Cardholder  
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder, AO, and AO’s 
supervisor received letters of caution. Level III APC has 
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recommended that cardholder account be suspended for 30 
days. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune (00073) 
Item Purchased: $38.54 
Dollar Value of Transaction: Towels and other household 
items at Walmart for Peruvian Officer. 
How it was discovered: Cardholder  
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder, AO, and AO’s 
supervisor received letters of caution. Level III APC has 
recommended that cardholder account be suspended for 30 
days. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Item Purchased: Fed Ex charges   
Dollar Value of Transaction: $4.41 
How it was discovered: AO  
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder formally counseled. 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Item Purchased: Fuel at Chevron 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $73.00 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder account closed and 
corporate account suspended. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Item Purchased: Fuel at Chevron 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $54.02 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder account closed and 
corporate account suspended 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Exam Packet for State Certification 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $477.00 
How it was discovered: APC monthly transaction review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Letter of caution to 
cardholder, investigation pending. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Professional Association Membership 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $99.00 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Letter of caution to 
cardholder, investigation pending. 
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Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Franklin Covey Planner inserts    
Dollar Value of Transaction: $54.80 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review  
Disciplinary actions taken: Latter of caution and 
investigating reimbursement 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Gaylord Opryland Shuttle 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $11.00 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder received 60-day 
suspension and must attend refresher training. The U.S. 
treasury was reimbursed for the total amount.  
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Gaylord Opryland 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $20.00 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder received 60-day 
suspension and must attend refresher training. The U.S. 
treasury was reimbursed for the total amount. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Item Purchased: Lodging, Radisson Opryland 
Dollar Value of Transaction: 197.03 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder received 60-day 
suspension and must attend refresher training. The U.S. 
treasury was reimbursed for the total amount. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center  
(00087) 
Item Purchased: Lodging, Gaylord Opryland 
Dollar Value of Transaction: 609.52 
How it was discovered: APC monthly review 
Disciplinary actions taken: Cardholder received 60-day 
suspension and must attend refresher training. The U.S. 
treasury was reimbursed for the total amount. 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Corps Base Camp Butler (00088) 
Item Purchased: Soda 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $5.97 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 






Level IV APC: Marine Corps Base Camp Butler (00088) 
Item Purchased:  Food 
Dollar Value of Transaction: $40.61 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Reimbursement and AO cancelled 
cardholder account. 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Corps Base Camp Butler (00088) 
Item Purchased: Lodging  
Dollar Value of Transaction: $939.75 
How it was discovered: Cardholder 
Disciplinary actions taken: Reimbursement and AO cancelled 
cardholder account. 
 
3. Number of purchase that exceeded authorized limits:  
10 
 
4. Number of requirements that were split to circumvent 
the micro purchase threshold: 259 
 
5. Number of purchases that were prohibited items as 
identified in the purchase card instruction/desk 
guides: 158 
 
I.  Weaknesses in Internal Management Controls: 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (00073) 
Weakness Area: Documented screening of mandatory sources 
Corrective Action: All AOs received training letters. 
Discrepant accounts will be re-audited in 3 months and 
future infractions will result in 30-day suspension. 
Level IV APC: Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island 
(00075) 
Weakness Area: Documentation of certification in proper 
time frame. 
Corrective Action: Proper certification timeline provided 
to all GCPC personnel. All AOs have also received 
additional training on how to properly document 
certification. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area: Maintenance of delegation letter 
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Corrective Action: APC will send e-mail to all activity 
GCPC personnel reiterating requirement. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area: Maintenance of documented training 
Corrective Action: APC will send e-mail to all activity 
GCPC personnel reiterating requirement. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area: Documented screening of mandatory sources 
Corrective Action: An activity-wide purchase card/call log 
is being developed and will be provided to all GCPC 
personnel. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area: Documentation of certification within proper 
timeframe. 
Corrective Action: Guidance will be sent to all AOs and 
cardholders outlining procedures for proper documentation 
of certification. General instructions for AOs on proper 
reconciliation, reallocation, and certification will be 
included. 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area: Proper request process 
Corrective Action:  A standard GCPC Purchase/Payment 
Request will be provided  to all AOs and cardholders. It 
will also be included in the role-based turnover files 
being developed by the activity.   
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Forces, Reserve (00077) 
Weakness Area:  Documented receipt by end user 
Corrective Action: The purchase request form will include 
the section to allow for the documented receipt. The new 
IOP will also reiterate the requirement. 
 
Level IV APC: Marine Air Ground Combat Center (00087) 
Weakness Area:  Proper request process 
Corrective Action: All personnel receiving additional 
training in this area. Discrepant personnel also received 
letters of caution. 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Corps Base, Quantico (00096) 
Weakness Area:  Documentation of certification in proper 
time frame 
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Corrective Action: Discrepant personnel have received 
training and notice that additional discrepancies will 
result in suspension action. 
 
Level IV APC:  Marine Corps Base, Quantico (00096) 
Weakness Area: Documented receipt by end user 
Corrective Action: All activity GCPC personnel have 
received reiteration of this requirement through e-mail. 
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APPENDIX B.  PURCHASE CARD ALERT NUMBER 6 
(16 APRIL 2003) 
 
THIS ALERT IS APPLICABLE TO: 
 
APPROVING OFFICIALS  
   
CARDHOLDERS  
 
SUBJECT:  Blocking of Merchant Category Codes 
 
 
The purpose of this Purchase Card Alert is to remind 
Approving Officials and Cardholders of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) policy restricting purchases of 
items/services from merchants coded in certain categories.  
This policy does not restrict "what" is purchased, but 
rather restricts purchases from certain types of merchants.  
The below listed codes are blocked DoD wide and purchases 
are prohibited from merchants registered under these 
category codes.   
 
4829--Wire Transfer-Money Orders  6211—SecurityBrokers/Dealers 
5932--Antique Shops      6760--Savings Bonds 
5933--Pawn Shops       7012--Timeshares 
5937--Antique Reproductions     7273--Dating & Escort Services 
5044--Jewelry Stores  7995--Betting, Casino Gaming Chips,  
5960--Direct Marketing Insurance          Off- Track Betting                                                        
6010--Financial Institutions Manual 8651--Political Organizations 
      Cash Advance   9211--Court Costs, Alimony, Child  
6011--Financial Institutions    Support  
      Automatic Cash Advance  9222—Fines  
6051--Non-Financial Institutions- 9223--Bail and Bond Payments 
      Foreign Currency, Money  9311--Tax Payments 
      Orders, Travelers Checks 9700--Automated Referral Service 
            
 
In addition to the above-listed codes, your Agency Program 
Coordinators have carefully reviewed the mission-specific 
purchase card usage of each activity under the Purchase 
Card Program.  The authority of the cardholders has been 
tailored by blocking non-mission specific merchant category 
codes in the US Bank System. For example, car washes are 
prohibited purchases within the WHS/RE&F Purchase card 
program, therefore, all car wash vendors will be blocked 
from all card holders.  The cardholders will not be able to 
X 
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purchase from "blocked" merchants.  This process will 
ensure that purchases are made only from authorized types 
of merchants.   
 
If you experience a decline on your card, have the merchant 
check with their bank to make sure their category code has 
been input correctly.  If everything is correct between the 
merchant and his bank, then call your APC and request a 
one-time approval of the instant purchase or approval to 
make purchases from this merchant category in the future.  
When contacting the APC for this approval, be prepared to 
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